This article identifies the extent to which fiscal and regulatory action by state governments shapes the formation of sectors-in this case, including the local availability, organizational formalization, and quality of teachers in child care centers nationwide. These state-level effects are compared to the local effects of family demand and associated demographics of households. Although demand factors (e.g., maternal employment, income levels, and ethnic com- 
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disparate child care field, one plagued by strident contests over how young children should be raised and by whom. Rather than see sector formation deterministically, we often observe state actors penetrating a highly pluralistic organizational field, attempting to mediate among this mix of organizations and interests, a conception of state action detailed by Dahl (1982) and Offe (1984) .
The class-analytic tradition further emphasizes the struggle among classes and competing institutions, including battles over which children gain access to formalized or higherquality schooling (Carnoy 1984; Giddens 1986) . From this viewpoint, the intensity of family demand and the capacity of local communities to create child care centers must be seen as being situated within a stratified class structure. Here, we expect to see little association between state policy action and a more equitable availability of centers, since families with greater purchasing power drive local availability and quality (Wrigley 1999 ). Other class theorists have offered less-deterministic portrayals, suggesting that politics, such as struggles within state governments over spending and whether to target funding on low-income communities, do matter (Hicks 1999; Rubinson 1986 ). Indeed, the state may be central to the process of sector formation, especially in relation to distributional outcomes across communities.
Neoinstitutional theorists have relaxed the assumption, so fundamental to political-economy accounts, that intention-filled actors engineer the rationalization of fields (Powell and DiMaggio 1991) . For example, the downward incursion of formal schooling into children's preschool years may occur with little original agency exercised by political actors. One early claim of neoinstitutional theorists was that state actors are simply instruments of a much deeper "great rationalization project," serving to advance "statemanaged childhood at the institutional level" (Boli and Meyer 1983:217-18 ). The growth of child care centers may simply have coincided with the creeping formalization of children's lives in general (Thomas and Meyer 1984) . Baum and Oliver (1991, 1992) showed, for example, that the growth of centers was more robust in neighborhoods that were more densely populated with civic institutions, which acted as scaffolds for activists who were seeking to formalize child care. Other neoinstitutionalists have argued that politics do matter in how new sectors are organized-acting to strengthen interorganizational linkages, sanction conceptions of what "quality work" looks like, and fund legitimated service providers (DiMaggio 1983; DiMaggio and Anheier 1990). From this account, we would expect more effective sector formation in child care where neighboring fields, such as public education and family welfare programs, receive strong public support (Fuller and Holloway 1996; Scott et al. 2000) .3
These theoretical accounts offer different prognoses for the state's likely efficacy as it enters a new sector. They also suggest factors that may contribute to the formation of sectors (Scott and Meyer 1991) . If policy action is viewed as endogenous to local demand, as is seen in modernization and class-analytic perspectives, then family income, class status (community ethnic composition, for example), urbanization, and local costs faced by child care centers become salient predictors of the formation of sectors. To assess the state's influence, we should account for the government's fiscal efforts and regulatory intensity.4 Or, if the child care sector is borrowing the formalization mechanisms of neighboring sectors, then we should factor in parents' school attainment and the presence of civic organizations locally that may offer institutional scaffolds for child care activists.
The Fragmented and Contested Child Care Sector
Despite the rapid growth in family demand for organized child care centers and increasing governmental intervention, sector formation remains at a primitive stage. The share of children younger than age 5 who attended child care centers rose from 6 percent to 30 percent between 1965 and 1997 (Hofferth 1999 , Smith 2002 
METHOD

Design and Data
We first describe variation in the child care sector's size, level of formalization, and quality of teachers key elements of sector formation as observed among centers nested within the nation's zip codes. We then assess the extent to which aspects of family demand and local organizations help to explain variability in the elements of sector formation. In addition, these family-demand and local organizational factors (at Level 1) are nested within their respective states (at Level 2). At the state level, we assess the effects of state government spending and regulatory intensity on sector formation. We present hierarchical linear models (HLM) to assess the independent influence of Level 1 and Level 2 predictors (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992). Finally, we assess the extent to which state government actions (at Level 2) act to mediate the influence of local demand (at Level 1 ) on sector formation. Table 1 lists all constructs and measures used in the analysis. The table sorts constructs and possible predictors of sector formation according to the theoretical lines from which they are derived. The available data did not allow us to adjudicate exhaustively among the competing accounts of sector formation. Yet we could thoroughly study multiple indicators of family demand and demographics (aggregated to zip codes) and state policy action. In the discussion, we return to the question of which theoretical accounts are supported by our findings and which are not. In short, our analysis focuses on the ability of state governments to influence sector formation, after taking into account local variation in family demand. Fuller and Strath (2001) . Zip codes do not define natural communities, but they are reasonably small units for which many data related to child care are now available. Since we were characterizing local communities (at Level 1), this unit needed to be sufficiently large to contain a significant number of families, child care centers, and civic organizations.
Indicators of Sector Formation
Local Family Demand and Institutional
Environment Prior evidence suggests that the distribution of child care centers is affected by local family demand, segmented by parents' class position and economic capacity to express demand (Smith 2002; Wrigley 1999 ). However, the supply of centers also tends to be relatively high in some lowincome communities, compared to workingclass areas, because of the growth in targeted subsidies flowing through Head Start and state-funded programs (Phillips et al. 1994 ). Thus, in our initial analysis, we regressed center size, formalization, and teacher qualities on (zip code aggregates of) indicators of family demand (median household income and maternal employment rates for mothers with children younger than age 5), school attainment (the share of adults in each zip code who completed four-year college degrees and the share with high school diplomas and some college), ethnic composition, and urbanization (the share of the zip code's population residing in an urban, suburban, or farm area, as designated by the U.S. Bureau of the Census).
We also examined the extent to which the local population of religious and civic organizations helps to predict the formation of a sector, given the neoinstitutional focus on scaffolding from neighboring fields (Baum and Oliver 1991 States with more aggressive spending on child care tend to press for more stringent regulations of quality, often attached to funding streams that flow to subsidized centers or apply to private centers in middle-class areas as well. These quality rules typically pertain to teacher-certification requirements, the maximum number of children within a classroom, and the ratio of children per teacher (or adult staff member). We created an indicator of each state's regulatory strength by combining the maximum allowable ratio of children per teacher and per adult (including aides) in center classrooms for 3 year olds and then for 4 year olds. The regulatory data were for 1994, as reported by Morgan and Azer (1995) . This indicator was highly correlated with a related measure: the maximum number of children who can attend any given classroom. Child-staff ratios are also predictive of child development outcomes for youngsters from low-income families (for a review, see Phillips et al. 1994 ). We studied training requirements for center teachers and classroom aides, but these requirements were difficult to standardize across states and yielded a more truncated ordinal index compared to the continuous child-staff ratios.
Analytic Models
HLM techniques offer a useful method for assessing the relative influence of state policy on sector formation, relative to effects stemming from local patterns of family demand, demographics, and the local organizational environment. Ordinary least-squares regression would not account for the grouping of the 9,197 zip-code units within states. This grouping means that zip codes are not independent and should not be treated as independent in our analyses. When we looked at the impact of local factors on sector formation, for example, HLM allowed us to account for the interdependence of zip codes situated within the 47 usable states (after excluding three states-Alaska, Hawaii, and Iowa-and the District of Columbia that displayed poor data or outlying values on key variables). And we took advantage of the nested structure of the data when assessing whether state-level factors (at Level 2) help to explain either the differences in mean features of sector formation across states or the strength of association (at Level 1) between our zip code-level factors and the indicators of sector formation.
Assessing Level 1 Relationships
Initial models assess the extent to which family Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for all the variables that were used in the analysis. Within the median zip code, 20 individuals reported that they were employed as a center teacher or staff member for every 1,000 children aged 0-5. When individuals reported paid employment in child care, including those who worked in FCCHs and as individual caregivers, the median moved up to 46 caregivers per 1,000 young children.
FINDINGS Descriptive Results
Indicators of Sector Formation
Averaging across zip codes (means), 31 percent of all child care providers reported employment at a center. Their annual earnings in 1990 averaged $8,448, indicating that many teachers and staff worked part time. On average, 37 percent of all center staff reported they had completed a four-year college degree. This share dropped to 23 percent when all individuals who provided child care were included.
Family-demand Attributes
The Fuller, Loeb, Strath, and Carrol 7.6% diploma and some college the count of center teachers per 1,000 children is lower in zip codes with a higher median household income (the linear term), suggesting that targeted state or federal subsidies may effectively raise the size of the workforce in poor communities. The positive squared term indicates that this negative relationship flattens and becomes less pronounced for middle-class and higher-income communities, confirming earlier work detailing the higher availability of centers in affluent communities.
The size of the workforce is also greater among zip codes with higher levels of adult school attainment. This relationship does not display the curvilinear relationship that is evident for household income. The center teaching force is considerably lower as the percentage of residents, Latino or African American, increases. And the size of the workforce is higher in urban communities and lower in suburban areas (the base), again suggesting a dip in availability among middle-class neighborhoods.
Communities with a higher number of adults who are employed by religious and civic organizations display larger counts of center-based teachers. Both predictors are significantly related to the count of teachers per 1,000 young children among zip codes. This finding suggests that the local organizational environment-and perhaps the infrastructure that is implied-offer scaffolds for child care activists and civic groups who push successfully to establish more centers.
With regard to sector formalization (the percentage of all child care workers who are employed by centers), median household income appears to be marginally related. Yet the maternal employment rate is negatively related: Zip codes with a higher proportion of mothers in the labor force face a less-formalized set of child care providers. The share of resident adults with some college education is negatively related to formalization as well (high school only or less schooling is the base). This finding may be the result of state intervention into the market for low-income Turning to the quality of teachers, we observed a somewhat different pattern. The linear income effect is strongly significant and negative, and the squared income terms shows no significant relationship. The pattern is similar when estimating earnings of center teachers, but the linear effect is not statistically significant. Overall, this finding suggests that teachers who work in subsidized centers that are situated in low-income communities have higher attainment levels, compared to those who work in blue-collar or middle-class areas. This pattern was also found in an earlier national probability sample of centers (Fuller et al. 1993) . At the same time, teachers' attainment is considerably higher in communities with more highly educated adults. This effect may be substituting for the squared income term for middle-class and affluent areas. Earnings, however, remain lower in zip codes with higher levels of adult attainment, the nonsubsidized portion of the child care sector. Table 5 reports results for the Level 2 models. Remember that only modest shares of variance in sector formation can be attributed to between-state variation. We see that state fiscal capacity and spending on child care significantly contribute to the size of the teacher workforce. Spending on the neighboring sectors of education and welfare is also related to sector size, but just fails to reach statistical significance. Overall, more activist states, those with stronger tax bases and greater spending on education and welfare, display higher counts of center teachers per capita.
State Policy Action
Sector formalization and the quality of teachers are related to spending on education and welfare, as well as to direct expenditures on child care. In addition, state fiscal effort (levels of taxation) is predictive of teachers' attainment and earnings. Beyond spending activity, we found a negative relationship between the regulatory index and teachers' earnings. This negative relationship could be attributable to higher costs born by centers when they attempt to enter the field. Similarly, tighter regulations on quality require the hiring of more staff members to meet ratio rules, which, in turn, may reduce wage levels. Overall, however, we observed little relationship between regulatory intensity and sector formation after we took into account the other state factors.
We included aggregated demographic controls (which were not collinear with predictors of state policy). States with higher shares of African American and Latino residents display higher levels of sector formalization except that more heavily Latino states have center teachers with lower school attainment. Reductions in chi-square statistics indicate that the inclusion of the state-level factors improved estimation of the formation of local sectors, after Level 1 factors were taken into account.
Does State Policy Mediate the Effects of Local Factors?
We estimated the extent to which moreactive state governments were able to moderate the more-robust Level 1 effects on sector formation, those stemming from family demand and demographics. HLM assesses whether the variation in slope coefficients, say, between median household income and the size of the sector's workforce among zip codes, are steeper or flatter for states with stronger spending patterns. The bottom half of Table 6 reports estimates of the average Level 1 slopes for which family-demand factors predict the size of the sector and teachers' earnings (similar to the Level 1 results in Table 4 ). The top half of Table 6 provides find- The most robust estimates of the variableeffects models (within Level 1) pertain to the influence of median household income on the size of the teacher workforce and teachers' earnings. We again observe that this relationship is strong and negative (the P8 coefficient in the first row), since poorer communities appear to have benefited from targeted state support for the expansion and formalization of centers.
But does this relationship vary in magnitude under different state policy conditions? The gamma terms that follow (Y81 to 788) indicate increments or decrements to the slope estimates, based on the inclusion of state policy factors. We found that more-assertive fiscal action by state governments is associated with less-negative (flatter) slopes. For example, the relationship between median household income and workforce size (at Level 1) becomes less negative in states with higher fiscal capacity and spending on the educational and welfare sectors (Y81 = .0002 and 783 = 5.00, respectively). This finding shows that wealthier states that politically mobilize stronger spending may be able to support nonpoor families through the greater availability of center-based teachers and programs. Conversely, states with lower spending levels or perhaps less fiscal capacity target resources more exclusively on low-income communities. Although the significance levels fall short (t-statistics), the cumulative affect of these positive gamma coefficients shows that more activist states appear to be building a sector that is not exclusively tied to poor neighborhoods. This pattern is further evident in that states that are more heavily populated by African Americans display a more strongly negative relationship between median household income and size of the workforce among zip codes (Y87 = -.55) than do others. States that are more heavily populated by Latinos show flatter slopes between household income and size of the workforce, suggesting that targeting low-income families is less restrictive in these states. Returning to the four theoretical accounts of the formation of sectors, our findings do suggest that the dynamics shaping the child care sector resemble the earlier modernization of formal schooling. Indeed, we observed that communities that are populated by better-educated parents and employed mothers invest more heavily in child care centers and employ more and better-qualified teachers, compared to communities with less capacity to pursue the formation of human capital. The influence of local civic and church organizations on the formation of the child care sector, apparently by offering scaffolds and tools, supports the neoinstitutional argument that the rationalization of childhood stems from the modern, neoclassical assumptions that underlie the school institution.
Yet two results support a less-deterministic, pluralistic conception of how rationalized sectors develop from disparate organizations. First, the negative association between a community's median household income and the size of its child care center's workforce demonstrates that the steady growth of subsidies that are targeted to low-income families has effectively shaped the size of the local sector and, to some extent, levels of formalization and the quality of teachers. This inverse relationship is explained, in part, by federal investments in Head Start preschools and welfarerelated child care, interventions that cannot be gauged by states' spending levels. So, while local-demand factors are more consistently related to the size of the sector than are state-level measures, these curvilinear income effects suggest that the federal government has effectively focused resources on lowincome communities. This finding is further evidenced by the fact that the sector's formalization is lower in zip codes with higher levels of school attainment. Second, state fiscal activism matters in boosting the size and formalization of the local sector and the quality of teachers. Variation among states for the sector-formation indicators is small compared to variability among zip codes. But the effects on state intercepts are significant. In addition, the strong correlations between median household income and sector size and teachers' earnings are moderated by state fiscal activism. The center workforce is larger in blue-collar and middle-class communities when states invest more in the child care sector and in neighboring sectors like education and family welfare programs. Here, the state's influence extends beyond the expansion and formalization of the sector in poor communities. It appears to be financing broader family eligibility for center programs and publicly legitimating the expansion of child care into middle-class communities, although this claim requires additional research. Furthermore, the state's influence may be growing locally, given the dramatic gains over the 1 990s in federal and state spending on child care and early education, as we detailed earlier.
State activism in sectors that border on the child care field appears to exert spillover effects. We discovered, for instance, that sector formalization (in terms of the centerbased segment's size relative to informal providers), along with teachers' school attainment and wages, were all higher in states that invested in the proximal sectors of education and welfare. This finding lends support to the neoinstitutional argument that a new sector bridges over more established ones, drawing legitimacy, organizing tools, and allied funding. Similarly, the presence of more civic and religious organizations contributed to the size of the local child care sector, supporting the argument that institutional environs advance a normative consensus on how social activities can be rationally organized and publicly funded (DiMaggio 1983).
Pluralistic politics-and how they variably play out across federal and state governments-appear to matter. These politics are sometimes sector specific, notwithstanding the allied contributions of nearby sectors and local organizations. We did not observe a simple, homogeneous pattern of expansion and formalization of the sector across states, nor did we find that the child care sector simply mimics the bureaucratic organization of, say, public education. Far from it. State-level politics have variably pushed legislatures to invest in child care and preschool programs, and states variably benefit from Head Start and federal child care programs, depending on their demographic conditions. In addition, spending seems to be more influential than is regulatory action in shaping the size and formalization of the sector.
Future work must take into account the recursive nature of pluralist politics. The rapid growth of the child care sector has led to calls for stronger regulation of quality. As the number of centers has grown, public school advocates have taken notice and now wave the "school readiness" banner, seeking to advance children's early development and boost the number of teaching jobs. As market-oriented policies gain legitimacy in this decentralized sector-particularly the explosive growth of child care vouchers-various local caregivers resist universal conceptions of quality, from churches, school districts, and Head Start centers to licensed homes and individual relatives who obtain voucher support. Under pluralistic competition for public resources, state and federal governments now aid diverse constituencies who, in turn, lobby the state to enact a patchwork of policies.
On balance, a pluralistic organizational account of the formation of sectors may best fit young sectors that operate on the cusp of private markets, driven by class-based family demands and significant state investment and Against this backdrop, our findings show that the government is making inroads in equalizing access to child care centers, formalizing the sector, and increasing the quality of teachers-at least in lower-income communities. But this sector may not rationalize along the Weberian lines that still characterize public schools. Market forces, class-structured family demand, and the distribution of local organizations instead may drive the future development of the sector in ways that threaten to exacerbate inequalities for families and limit the quality of education for many children. But they may complement a State Formation and the Child Care SectorI L
